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Abstract: This work aims to reflect on how to overcome obstacles that confront the ability to think rationally: the 
intellectual capacity involving the reflexive abstraction and its elaboration in the corresponding argument. It begins 
with the statement that if it is observed, on the one hand, an increase in the verbalized colloquial thought logical 
complexity, on the other hand it is noticed a lack of competence in the intellectual analytic operations of the rational 
processes underlying it. In other words, nurtured by the knowledge processes and products the abstract and deductive 
thinking generated from the scientific-technical field, the contemporary rationality would communicate with society 
in a neutralized way under the form of social representation which is, therefore, tinged with ideological contributions, 
uncritical irrationalities and/or rationalizations. Thus, this work intends to reflect on how to subsidize overcoming 
obstacles to the entire exercise of universal reason and/or of hermeneutic rationality, equipping counterpoints to 
impediments created by ignorance or by negativity or else by dogmatic thinking cores.
Keywords: rationality, reflexive abstraction, logical mathematics, scientific knowledge, ethics.
“The potency of the intellectual instrument is 
understood as so great that the great scientific 
creators (Einstein, Dirac) begin to believe, in their 
hearts, that nature can be understood. It could be 
said that one needs to simply put it to the test of 
rational construction, and this already constitutes a 
triumph of reason.”
Jean Ullmo1
“Doxa is the voice of the natural. That which is as 
if it was nothing. It is Medusa, who petrifies those 
who look at her.”
Roland Barthes2
In commenting on the film by Margarethe Von 
Trotta about Hannah Arendt3, Telles (2013) says:
* Corresponding address: neuzaapg@ig.com.br
1 “On voit la puissance de l’instrument intellectuel, puissance si grande 
que les grandes créateurs scientifiques (Einstein, Dirac) recommencent 
à croire au fond d’eux mêmes que la nature peut être devinée. Disons du 
moins qu’il suffit de la mettre à l’epreuve de la construction rationelle, et 
cela constitue dèjá un triomphe de la raison. (p. 704).”
2 Text taken from the catalogue of the exhibition entitled “Roland 
Barthes”, about the work of the author, held at the Centre Georges Pom-
pidou, Paris, from November 27th 2002 to March 10th 2003.
3 The film discusses the coverage of the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Israel, 
made by Hannah Arendt for The New Yorker. In this essay she describes 
her impressions and defends the thesis that not everyone who practiced 
war crimes during Nazism were monsters. The American and Jewish so-
ciety turned against her, but she kept her positions (Estado de São Paulo 
Newspaper, Section 2, 8/24/2013).
Instead of emotionally taking sides against 
Eichmann, Arendt opted to continue thinking ratio-
nally, showing the incongruities and inconsistencies 
of the trial itself. Facing the scary Nazism frenzy, 
she understood that, more than ever, it was neces-
sary to use the ability to think, reason, reflect. The 
issue of thought, of the use of rationality to fight 
irrationality, is central in her positioning (p. C12).
And this author concludes that Hannah Arendt by 
Von Trotta is an adventure film, the greatest of adventures 
– the intellectual one. “It shows the risks and adventures 
facing those who dare to think and bravely refuse to give 
up the ability to reflect and analyze, the only instruments 
against the savagery that lurks in the darker recesses of us 
all” (p. C12).
For Telles, Von Trotta’s film would be “the greatest 
of adventures – the intellectual one.” In fact, the protagonist 
of his narrative is Hannah Arendt, since in her argument, 
she leads in first person an unusual and risky experience, 
which would generate results in the realm of the unimagi-
nable. We refer to the analyses published by her (Arendt, 
1963-1964/2014), identifying and reporting implicit contra-
dictions and ambiguities in the process of Eichmann’s trial 
in Jerusalem, showing the strata subjacent to him which 
are not clarified and/or clarifying, contaminating the de-
bate on the question of the Jewish Holocaust (1939-1945).
Affirming the failure of the Court of Jerusalem, 
Arendt (1963-1964) assigns it to the lack of affirmation of 
three essential items: the problem of the predefinition of 
justice in the court of victors, a valid definition of “crime 
against humanity” and a clear recognition of the new kind 
of criminal who commits this crime, concluding that “to 
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talk in colloquial terms (about Eichmann), he just never re-
alized what he was doing” (p. 310). She expresses in this 
way the interpretation of what was seized of the concept 
of “banality of evil” produced by the junction between de-
structive forces and the bureaucratization of public life, a 
Medusa who petrifies those who look at her like images in 
parallel mirrors, according to the words of Roland Barthes 
transcribed in the epigraph of this essay.
However, in extension, the understanding of the 
implications of Arendt’s narrative goes beyond the strictly 
intellectual dimension to penetrate the complex ethical-
political plan related to the disciplinarian criteria of the 
extroversion of reflections, of the transparency of the com-
munication of the results of rational thought to the social 
body, pointing out that the risks of reflecting and analyz-
ing might not manifest themselves so intensely, if there is 
not, on the thinker’s part, a clarifying commitment directed 
at the crowds. Such commitment not only shows itself in 
superlative form in the mentioned study by Arendt, as it 
consists in its own narrative. In the writing of Eichmann 
in Jerusalem, Arendt proposes, with generosity, erudition 
and humility, that the reader becomes part of her thinking. 
Maybe the impact of the scandal caused by the occasion 
of the publication of the study was due to that, because it 
constitutes itself at the same time in political journalism 
and philosophical reflection.
This essay aims to reflect on how to overcome these 
obstacles that are put before the ability to think rationally, 
the intellectual capacity that involves reflective abstraction 
and its elaboration in a corresponding argument. It also 
aims to reflect on conditions that circumscribe and limit its 
clarified and clarifying propagation to the social body, as 
an open critique to the uninterrupted growth of the crowds 
participant in it. It is based on the perception that, if it is 
possible to observe, on one hand, an increase in the logic 
complexity of colloquial verbalized thinking, on the other, 
there is an absence of competence in intellectual operations 
of analysis of rational processes subjacent to it. That is, con-
temporary rationality, fueled by the processes and products 
of knowledge generated through the abstract and deductive 
thinking of the technical-scientific field, would communi-
cate with society in a naturalized way, in the form of social 
representation (Moscovici, 1961) and, therefore, laden with 
ideological contributions of irrationalities and/or acritical 
rationalizations. The aim is to reflect, then, about how to 
subsidize the overcoming of obstacles to the universalizing 
of the full exercise of reason and/or of the hermeneutics 
of rationality, by instrumenting counterpoints to the im-
pediments engendered by ignorance (Caorsi, 1994) or by 
negativity (Freud, 1921/1996) or by the dogmatic cores of 
thought (Habermas, 1983/1989)4.
4 In the words of this author, it is the “social world of legitimately reg-
ulated interpersonal relationships – a world that is naively habituated 
and recognized without problems” (Habermas, 1983, p. 156). And, in 
an observation made by Prof. Dr. Lafayette de Moares at the personal 
meeting with the researchers, he pointed out the fact that “dogmatic core 
of thought” should be translated from German as “dogmatic core of the 
thinker” (meeting in November 2014).
In previous studies (Abbud, 1990, 2010), the ques-
tion of preceptorial interventions which emulated reflex-
ive acts in situations of formal education were discussed. 
Would they be possible? How to produce them? Such in-
quiries were instigated, at the time, by concerns arising 
from the practice of teaching by the author, persisting until 
today, manifesting themselves among scholars and educa-
tors, subscribing themselves in increasingly larger fields of 
meanings and complexity and challenging in the pursuing 
of the investigative search for clarification about them. Its 
focus, the problem of the transmission of conditions which 
implicate in scientific-theoretical knowledge to promote 
the protagonist exercise of critical intellectual thought.
Science as an institution combines functions of 
reason and experience in the constitution of knowledge. 
Knowledge, thus, said to be scientific. Its method consists in 
intellectual critique, the logical method of modern science 
to be applied in the analysis of events, facts and phenomena. 
The logical method of criticism of truths laid down about 
the physical and social world and its epistemological and 
historical-cultural developments (Tassara, 2003). Would it 
be possible to emulate it, encourage its emergence, teach it, 
propitiate its transcendence in the generation of new forms 
of knowledge? To this end, teaching practice has been as-
suming that, first of all, it would be necessary to config-
ure a zeitgeist of scientific creation, because to teach is to 
transmit experiences, to communicate the social links of 
which we are depositories. And, when it comes to complex 
experiments like the one being discussed, that transmis-
sion would need to support itself on processes of commu-
nication structured over planned sequences of information, 
organized according to logical-psychological criteria and 
epistemological-theoretical foundations.
It follows, then, that in the process of scientific cre-
ation it is necessary to articulate, as outlining conditions of 
the search for solutions to problems under investigation, of 
creative invention, implications and/or inspirations of log-
ical-mathematical formalism and restrictions imposed by 
the data of reality derived from experimentation and/or ob-
servation. Soon, the nature of this knowledge will also be 
logical-mathematical because it sustains itself in logical ar-
guments, inside of which it constitutes itself in solution/in-
vention, it structures itself and is structured over necessary 
conclusions. Deepening the understanding of this process 
of creation leads therefore to the decoupage of method, to 
which it is proposed proceeding from the writings of Ettore 
Majorana5 in his notes for the inaugural class of the course 
of Quantum Mechanics which he gave at the University 
of Naples in January 13th 1938 (quoted by Recami, 1989).
Starting his class discussing about classical 
Physics, from Galileo and Newton to the early 20th cen-
tury, Majorana describes it as inherently committed to 
the mechanistic conception of nature, a conception which, 
5 Ettore Majorana (1906-1938), Italian physicist who disappeared at the 
end of the thirties, had an important production in the field of particle 
physics, having worked at Via Panisperna (Rome) which has as symbolic 
figure Enrico Fermi.
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from Physics, extended itself not only to the related scienc-
es, but also to Biology and the Social Sciences, influencing 
all scientific thinking and part of contemporary philosoph-
ical thought, though, according to this author, the useful-
ness of the logical-mathematical method – that would be 
its only valid justificative – would have always remained 
exclusively circumscribed to Physics.
This conception of nature supports itself, for him, 
substantially on two pillars: the objective and independent 
existence of matter and physical determinism, both derived 
from common experience, widespread and considered uni-
versal, subsequently. The objectivity of matter would be a 
notion of common experience, which teaches that material 
objects have an existence in themselves, independently of 
the fact that they fall or not under our observation. Classic 
Mathematical Physics annexed to this elementary fact the 
claim that a mental representation of this objective world is 
possible, completely appropriate to its reality, and that this 
mental representation can consist in the knowledge of a se-
ries of numeric quantities sufficient to determine, at every 
point in space and in time, the state of the physical universe.
Conversely, according to Majorana, determinism 
would be only partly a notion of common experience. Next 
to facts that occur independently of the observer, there 
would be others – and not only in the biological world, but 
also in the social world – for which the occurrence is in the 
very least not very evident. Determinism, while universal 
principle of science, could therefore be formulated only as 
generalization of the laws governing the celestial mechan-
ics – the future configuration of the planetary system can 
be predicted by calculation, provided that its initial state is 
known, that is, the compilation of positions and velocities 
of the bodies that make up our planetary system.
Bachelard (1940/2009), in turn, proposes a possi-
ble dialogue between sensible reason and rational experi-
ence, intermediate processes that would be propitiators of 
a projective investigatory vision of invention and creation, 
which Bergson (1907/2010) would name “creative evolu-
tion”. The construction of potential fields of promotion of 
inventive thinking processes and of conduction of the sub-
jects in challenging and autonomous paths of thought has 
been a traditional object of study, which can be represented 
through the historical evolution of the main ideas formulat-
ed by thinkers, scientists and educators. The question that 
is being made, then, would have as a starting point how to 
articulate procedures capable of interacting with the forces 
of dispersion of thought subjacent to the polyphony of in-
formation derived from the ubiquity of experiences and 
social practices experienced by individuals and contempo-
rary collectives and the summaries required by intellectual 
processes which should arrange them into systems. This 
essay contextualizes a panorama in which possible answers 
to such comprehensive and complex questions insert them-
selves, that is: how, from an analysis of the common sense 
of living spaces, one can get to reflect rationally, ratiocinat-
ing and subsidizing the way out of irrational or unreason-
able situations (Santos, 2002), getting to the formulation 
of original and rationally competent interpretations to the 
confrontation of difficulties and proposing the forwarding 
of solutions.
This search, as already mentioned, would be sup-
ported by theoretical theses defended by scholars of rela-
tions between logic, language and thought, applying them 
in the analysis of cognitive processes relating to the ability 
of abstraction and deduction, necessary, though not suffi-
cient, for a competent argumentation and an autonomous 
exercise of the intellectual method of criticism. How to 
provide them?
Firstly, it is based on considerations based on the 
theoretical contribution offered by Hegenberg (1987) that, 
in writing about contemporary rationality, the original 
thesis that implied the hypothesis that there would be an 
interaction between logical processes implicit in argu-
ments that are subjected to the development of reasoning 
over colloquial contemporary issues and to the develop-
ment of logical-mathematical instruments arising from the 
advance of scientific knowledge in historical modernity 
is defended. That is, for this author, logical-mathematical 
developments would influence the knowledge of the com-
mon sense, through the propagation of logical implications 
derived from the advance of logical-mathematical knowl-
edge, which would begin to be applied in secular reasoning. 
However, in this essay it is considered that this propagation 
has not been presenting itself as a formal instrument, but 
only, recurrently, as content, in its semantic dimension.
On the other hand, the theories formulated by Piaget 
(1967) and by Piaget and Greco (1974) provide informa-
tion on relationships between logic, language and thought, 
which also limit the search for answers to questions about, 
after all, what would be rational knowledge. What from 
it would be derived from the subject and what would be 
derived from the object, in the act configured as such of 
knowing? And from these assertions, others would follow 
that are object of answers offered, mediating the formula-
tion of the psychogenetic method. That is, the one of how 
the transit between hierarchies of complexity in character-
ized states of intellectual operations could be explained, 
aiming at their generalization for the autonomous produc-
tion of new valid knowledge.
Assuming a piagetian perspective, Ramozzi-
Chiarottino (1973) states that hypothetical-deductive or 
formal thinking would take place through combinations 
understood as classifications and free relations, coming to 
mean the liberation of thought in relation to the object. As 
a result, in facing a problem-situation, the latter author ar-
gues that rather than these combinations, what would be 
significative is the emergence of the possibility of combin-
ing ideas and hypotheses in the form of affirmations and 
negations and of using propositional operations, such as 
implication (if... then), disjunction (or...), exclusion (either... 
or), or incompatibility, deductive conclusions being thus 
configured. That is, from certain hypothetical assump-
tions, reality no longer would be seen under an absolute 
view: it would be a view relativized through an abstraction 
Psicologia USP   I   www.scielo.br/pusp276
Eda Terezinha de Oliveira Tassara & Neuza Abbud
276
of abstraction, a meta-abstraction or a reflective abstrac-
tion. Reality would start to be experienced in the light 
of possibilities, supported by abstractions and sustaining 
deductions.
This way, it can be hypothesized that analyses of 
the common sense of living spaces offer information on 
logical dimensions, implied in the relations between lan-
guage and thought inherent to it, and may provide an in-
depth understanding of the thought manifested in them, 
from which a proper engineering of emulating procedures 
could be structured, contributing to the emergence of the 
intellectual capacity of competent reasoning. This would 
be a first necessary condition for a scientific substantiation 
of strategic interventions of transmission of the respective 
social links, aimed at the increase of analytical-argumenta-
tive ability subjacent to intellectual activity, as an universal 
form of communicative competence in contemporary glo-
balized society or, in the words of Telles (2013), to provide 
“the greatest of adventures, the intellectual one.”
In summary, these reflections are being grounded 
in the following theses and corollaries:
1. The operation of theoretical-scientific thought, 
being conditioned by propositional logic to 
which it is subjected, implies the ability to intel-
lectually operate reflective abstraction (Piaget, 
1967; Piaget & Greco, 1974; Chiarottino, 1973);
2. The logical-mathematical development subja-
cent to the evolution of scientific knowledge 
in historical modernity has been communicat-
ing with social life, externalizing itself in the 
forms of contemporary colloquial reasoning 
(Hegenberg, 1987);
3. This communication does not imply formal 
awareness of the corresponding logical struc-
tures operated in reasoning, presenting it-
self, repeatedly, as content, i.e. as semantics 
and therefore as ideology; it should be noted 
that a state of consciousness is being consid-
ered, as defined by Piaget (1968), as a state of 
signification.
And, derived from these theoretical theses, the fol-
lowing corollaries:
4. The logical-language-thought dimensions 
manifest themselves in an inseparable manner 
in the different linguistic substrates, being sub-
jacent in messages, speeches, arguments and 
narratives.
5. Modern thought, characteristic of contempo-
rary rationality, directs itself to the future, con-
stituting itself in ways of thinking of everyday 
life, conditioning understandings, explanations 
and justifications that substantiate solutions to 
theoretical-practical issues, as well as strate-
gies of coping with them.
This study of contemporary rationality will be de-
limited as having as origin the civilizing process originat-
ing in Ancient Greece, a dynamic panorama of the context 
of transformation of the meaning of the term “logos”, or 
reason, being traced. The words of Windelband (1970) il-
lustrate the property of this perspective, when this author 
claims to be the history of philosophy a narrative of the 
process of transformation of the world view and values of 
European humanity, in scientific concepts.
In another order of considerations, Umberto Eco 
(2001, 1988) punctuates clashes and differentiations sub-
jacent to the transformation of the meaning of the term 
“reason”, which he analyses with reference to the term “ir-
rationalism”, offering bases for an organization of his study.
Firstly, Umberto Eco (1988) articulates difficulties 
in the definition of the term “irrationalism”, stating that it 
is always done in contraposition to a historical model char-
acteristic of another way of thinking, said to be rational. 
Therefore, the author reflects on the need to conceptualize 
reason, having as reference the conditioning ways of think-
ing of determined sociocultural moment, considering it as 
a central fulcrum of rationalist schools of thought in the 
context of contemporary rationality.
Secondly, in trying to establish differences of mean-
ing between “rationalism” and “irrationalism”, considered 
by the author as two ways to decipher the world as text, he 
resorts to the argument that, both to Plato as for Aristotle, 
knowing meant searching for the causes, what brings back 
the theme of knowledge. Would these causes be evident in 
the object, that is, in attentive looks to its reality, enabling 
analyses leading to conceptual inferences, which would be 
the determinants of success in this decryption? In other 
words, how to abstract them, and also, would a deciphering 
abstraction result in legitimate knowledge?
Thirdly, still according to Eco, to define the world 
in causal terms it would be needed to establish a linear 
chain, supported by the principles of identity (a is equal a), 
of non-contradiction (it is impossible to be a and to not be a 
the same time) and of the excluded middle (either a is a or it 
is not a, a third possibility does not exist). The author, then, 
would be referring to the “modus ponens”, declaring as his 
“belief” that it would be the primordial pillar of rationality, 
which would lead to the beginnings of Aristotelian logic.
However, throughout the evolution of scientific 
and logical-mathematical knowledge, as referenced by 
Hegenberg (1987), there have been systematic progresses 
in Aristotelian logic, largely under the influence of mod-
ern mathematical analysis, bringing implications about 
the science of the need for conclusions – Logic – produced 
by the progress of the science of necessary conclusions 
– Mathematics.
The analysis offered by Hegenberg on the transfor-
mation of this way of “thinking”, based on the Aristotelian 
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view until the construction of symbolic-mathematical 
logic, leads to inferences about the production of new 
forms of thinking, suggesting there is a dynamic process 
of what would be guided and expanded in its transmission 
and learning by the social body. And so, other historically 
conditioned ways of thinking would be generated, result-
ing in the growth of logical-discursive competence, or of 
competent reasoning.
Hegenberg resumes the beginning of the science 
of Logic in Greece, with Aristotle, where the controversy 
generated by disputes between the theory of Parmenides 
and Zeno’s famous arguments – which denied the reality of 
movement making an improper use of the principle of non-
contradiction – contributed to highlight, in the arguments, 
the deductive powers essential to the necessary acceptance 
of demonstrations.
On the other hand, Socrates defended the value 
of concepts and the need to define them with accuracy. 
Through the process of maieutics, he drove his listeners to 
the analysis of terms under various perspectives, using pro-
cedures that instigated the search for answers to questions, 
seeking to lead them to the formulating of hypothesis with 
the intention that they noticed relations between causes and 
effects involved in beliefs, leading to the search and to the 
enhancement of intellectual reflective acts.
Socrates was the initiator of the analysis of seman-
tic processes, in the sense of considering which words 
would not represent the totality of their meaning, being 
understood as symbolic elaborations made by human be-
ings. The way to organize and structure them would be, in 
this perspective, in line with the principles of support, ac-
ceptability and consistency of the objective and subjective 
representations in light of the data of reality.
A typical Socratic procedure was the use of “para-
bles” – or examples taken from arts and crafts – to estab-
lish, in analogy to particular cases, a law or a universal 
principle: that is, that which for Aristotle was a Socratic 
induction of the particular to the universal.
Thus, in the history of Western thought, one can 
consider Socrates as the introducer of the idea that the ac-
tivity that has knowledge as its purpose must conform to 
rules, as in any other form of art. The Platonic dialogues 
show that, for Socrates, it would be necessary relating 
the validity of a knowledge to the way it is obtained to 
legitimize it — an idea that became the essence of any 
position that recognizes the prominent importance of the 
method to the legitimate criticism of the corresponding 
knowledge.
Socratic considerations would induce principles 
sustaining an accurate analysis on the process of formation 
of a more elaborate discursive competence, basing it on the 
clarity of the concepts contained in it, what would not do 
without an association to a consistent reasoning ability. To 
this end, Aristotelian logic offered elements for the ground-
ing of argumentative delivery, subsidizing it.
The complex construction of the Aristotelian meta-
physics and physics brought, also subjacent, a method that 
Aristotle presents in his logic studies. In these, after in-
troductory considerations in which he analyzes the terms 
and propositions, Aristotle starts to study the syllogistic 
structure common to all consistent and formally valid rea-
soning, the requirements for a reasoning, besides being 
formally correct, to also be true and the characteristics of 
the formally correct reasoning, going over, for example, 
the reason why the premises of syllogisms are not certain 
and would not meet all the requirements of a scientific 
demonstration. From these considerations, he provides the 
most relevant result of his logic, which was the doctrine 
of syllogisms. Aristotle considered his doctrine of syllo-
gisms based on any valid inference, defining and classify-
ing all valid forms of syllogism, distinguishing, also, the 
real syllogisms from the purely correct ones. For him, in 
fact, a correct syllogism would reach the truth if, and only 
if, the truth of the premises was proven. To demonstrate 
the truth of the premises, one could then resort to other 
syllogisms, but this process could not be reproduced ad 
infinitum. However, he also stated that there would be 
supreme principles evident in themselves, which would 
not need demonstration to be accepted: they would be the 
principles of identity, of non-contradiction and of the ex-
cluded middle. They would be principles that would im-
pose themselves for logic necessity, that is, they would be 
the basis of necessary knowledge.
This leads back to the modus ponens presented by 
Eco, being possible to conclude that Aristotle was respon-
sible for the true birth of Logic, of the science of reasoning, 
of arguments, of demonstrations and of the need deter-
mined by them in the knowledge of truth. Thought would 
be organized with the purpose of establishing, precisely, 
what could be considered as affirmation. For Aristotle, 
these claims are of the subject-predicate order, there being 
a fixed notion of truth for these derivations: if the predicate 
suits the subject or not, respectively, the sentence is true 
or false. Thus, this leads back to Socrates, because, for the 
understanding of a concept, its meaning being clear is nec-
essary, without which the attribution of truth or falseness to 
the affirmations would be impaired.
However, the Aristotelian logic remained intact un-
til the late 17th century and early 18th century, when the 
advancement of mathematical instruments, derived from 
the needs imposed by the evolution of scientific knowledge 
– notably by the demands of the application of the method 
in the theoretical-empirical study of the movement – made 
necessary the revision of logic, expanding it until its struc-
turing under the nomenclature of logical-mathematics, or, 
symbolic-logic, determining its subsequent historical open 
expansion, as an autonomous field of knowledge.
This process took place throughout the 19th cen-
tury under controversies and debates about relations be-
tween the fields of Logic and Mathematics, conducted 
under the leadership of eminent mathematicians and 
logicians, including Frege, Weierstrass, Gödel, Gauss, 
Whitehead, Bertrand Russell, Boole and others, evolv-
ing in such a way as to make this last author justify the 
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necessity of the revision of logic, stating that it no longer 
would be suitable for the way of thinking, especially in 
mathematics (quoted by Hegenberg, 1987). Thus emerges 
a new setting and in it a new direction related to the rela-
tionship between logic, semantics and syntax, expressed 
in a competent discursive capacity.
In this new setting, still according to Hegenberg, 
signaled by the work of Bertrand Russell that offers the syn-
thesis of a new revision of Logic, associating it to Math and 
employing symbolisms and representations, Mathematical 
Logic starts to evolve allowing algebraic operations.
The conditions of truth broadened being expressed 
today both through propositional calculus (if - so; and - or; 
if and only if), as through predicate calculus (constants, 
variables, universal and existential quantifiers), bring-
ing as a result the incorporation also of predicate calculus 
with equality, that is, the possibility of assigning different 
names to a same object. It is inaugurated thus the logical-
analytical approach, which allowed the tracing of paths 
for the study of relationships between language and real-
ity, making inquiries about connections between words 
which organize sentences and reality. Subsequently, Tarski 
(1930/1991) says that it is precisely the need to establish 
conditions of truth that would make the intelligibility of the 
sentence possible, allowing the conclusion that a proposi-
tion is significative if, and only if, conditions of truth are 
established for it.
Recently, having been axiomatized unorthodox 
or paraconsistent logical systems on the basis of which it 
is possible to verify the metamorphoses operated on the 
dynamics of reasoning in search of competent and logi-
cally orthodox demonstrations, a new field for the study 
of the pari passu discursive formation opens with logical-
mathematical “complexification” and the requirements for 
its incorporation into processes of reasoning applied in the 
demonstration of truths associated with statements or with 
their negation (Da Costa , 1991).
However, returning to the hypothesis of rationality 
of Hegenberg, in contemporary rationality there would be 
an interaction between argumentative forms, as the ones 
implied in the development of reasoning, and the evolution 
of scientific knowledge, or logical-mathematical knowl-
edge, influencing the knowledge of common sense not 
only in its semantic dimension, in its conceptual contents, 
but through the advancement of the instruments which 
support expanded forms of operations of logical-mathe-
matical implications.
If this panorama is traced here, configuring de-
scriptions, explanations and interpretations about what 
would be contemporary rationality, it says nothing about 
how to propitiate its proper exercise. Would operating the 
modus ponens be enough? The critical needs interposed 
by the logical method of modern science would depend on 
which fields of knowledge? How would the emergence of 
abstraction and deduction capacities be promoted, applying 
them appropriately in consistent demonstrations, identify-
ing incoherences, inconsistencies and contradictions in the 
critical construction of conclusions which affirm them-
selves over logic necessity, applying them in original argu-
ments formulated by their defenders? After all, from what 
was said, how can rationality be defined?
Rationality refers to logical and epistemological 
processes in which, from certain premises and, 
through arguing, legitimate consequences are de-
rived from, from a formal point of view; the logical 
relationship implies that, if a claim is accepted, its 
premises are being accepted ipso facto. Rationality 
requires precisely making transparent this logic 
derivation through arguing, what makes criticism 
possible, be it from a formal point of view, or from 
the point of view of the contents of the statement in 
question. Therefore, criticism and rationality are in-
separable components of the same epistemological 
process. (Tassara & Ardans, 2013, p. 285)
Thus, another operational requirement is evidenced. 
The ability to competently master the geometric method, 
applying it to epistemological criticism, what leads us to 
the contribution of Euclid, in systematizing the axiomatic 
method, in his study Elements. This method consists in as-
suming a limited number of definitions about what would 
be primitive beings of the system of thought, an assemblage 
of axioms or postulates that are statements related to the 
primitive beings, some common notions being constituted 
of statements of evident universal character, demonstrat-
ing, from them, true propositions or theorems, through a 
sequence of deductions that are based on primitive proposi-
tions and also on theorems previously demonstrated.
That said, it is possible to conclude that there would 
be necessary conditions for the exercise of competent ar-
gumentative reasoning that may be transmitted: what is 
the geometric method, how to operate it; what is the doc-
trine of syllogisms, how to process them; what are the 
analytical-discursive elements derived from logical-math-
ematical advancement and what do they imply and others. 
However, always from applications previously elaborated 
by other subjects of thought. To generalize such compe-
tence, however, the abstraction to compose the demanding 
axiomatization is necessary. How to emulate it? Without 
abstractions, there is no possibility of new demonstrations. 
Only the naturalized reproduction of logical-mathematical 
implications, that is, the latter become content, semantics 
and therefore social representations (Moscovici, 1961), 
strengthening covert ideologies.
To ensure this denaturalization, a meta-abstraction 
would be necessary, which would mean the understanding 
of form-content, syntax-semantics, logic-language-thought 
relationships, leading them to the possibility of methodi-
cal structuring of demonstration, susceptible to learning, 
although dependent on a sophisticated communication pro-
cess, but still possible.
As for meta-abstraction, it is unknown how to en-
courage it. The corresponding formation processes have 
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been supporting each other in the application of pedago-
gies based on models of thought/thinkers and of structur-
ing paradigms of methods. However, the intermingling 
between ideas, analyses, methods and theories – as out-
lined throughout the historic circuit presented here of the 
evolution of theoretical-scientific knowledge – strongly 
strengthens the theses defended by Genetic Epistemology 
(Piaget, 1967) as defining of a necessary condition for the 
configuration of competent, authentic and original thought, 
in the theoretical-scientific standard of its production – the 
necessary philological hermeneutics of the process of his-
torical construction of logical-mathematical knowledge.
It remains open for interpretation, beyond the is-
sue of meta-abstraction, the topic that opens this essay, re-
garding the critical intellectual adventure starring Hannah 
Arendt. How would it happen, which would be the “dark-
est recesses of us all” (Telles, 2013) that would prevent it? 
Would these impediments to enlightenment produced by 
ignorance, identity weaknesses, psychological negativities, 
dogmatic cores supporters of prejudices and authoritarian 
biases, be the obstacles to the competent, ethical and free 
use of rationality? Or, would this be a return to the prob-
lem pointed out by Aristotle in his doctrine of syllogisms 
about truths that need no demonstration, that would impose 
themselves for their logic necessity, or to the exercise of the 
modus ponens, also considered by Eco as essential for ra-
tional operation as basis of what he claims to be “his belief 
in the doctrine of rationalism”?
However, as already mentioned, for Tassara and 
Ardans (2013), criticism and rationality would be insepa-
rable components of the same epistemological process. 
Thus, under such assumption, the logical questioning of 
truths consists itself in rationality, and its exercise would 
imply the commitment to unconditional engagement of the 
subject of the knowledge in the rational process of decon-
struction of established truths, and construction of oth-
ers. That is, the criticism of semantics that Aristotle, when 
he defines truth or falseness of statements, considers to 
be arbitrary, due to judgments of conveniences based on 
conventions of shared languages. This would therefore be 
the ethics of rationality: the relentless pursuit of the logic 
criticism of the semantic arbitrariness demanding a meta-
reflective abstraction.
That said, the question of the social extraversion of 
the results of criticism, of which the adverse political con-
sequences are discussed by Von Trotta in his film, having 
had violently reached Hannah Arendt, still remains. It is 
evidenced thus another extract from the ethics of rational-
ity, beyond logical criticism itself: the communication of 
the results of the developed critical rational process, un-
disturbed communication, as Habermas (1990)6 calls it.
6 “I prefer to speak of the idea of undisturbed intersubjectivity. This idea 
can be obtained from the analysis of conditions necessary to general un-
derstanding – it characterizes the manifestation of symmetrical condi-
tions of the mutual and free recognition of subjects who act communica-
tively among themselves” (Habermas, 1990, p. 106).
Under such configuration, it can be affirmed that 
Eichmann in Jerusalem fulfills in a paroxysmal way 
the requirements of the ethics of rationality as exposed, 
pointing at and questioning the inaccurate fluidity with 
which terms and arguments were used to describe, ex-
plain and interpret facts, polluting meanings and crite-
ria and, thus, contaminating a priori conclusions, many 
of which were tautologically supported by the starting 
premises. We believe that this finding can be understood 
as a determinant of the appointed failure of the trial court, 
which we synthetized as a fallacious ghost omnipresent 
at the trial, a case-by-case indistinction between law and 
justice, permeating the entire course of the process. Here, 
perhaps, it would be pertinent to transcribe the words of 
Eichmann as summarizing of this perception: “I am not 
the monster that I am made out to be. I am the victim of 
an error of judgment (p. 269).” And Arendt continues: “... 
confirmed what Servatius [Eichmann’s lawyer] had said: 
‘His conviction that he had to suffer for the acts of others 
was deep’”(pp. 269-270). Would his words indicate that 
the trial would have had mobilized him reflexively?
Under such perspective, the conclusion that the 
necessary condition for the competent, ethical and free 
use of rationality is limited to repertoires dependent on 
specific socializing procedures, supporters of logical crit-
icism itself, seems to be correct. However, in our view, the 
impediments to this usage located in “the darkest recesses 
of us all” (Telles, 2013) would not act directly on its exer-
cise. They may relate to the motivations and experiences 
prior and/or posterior to them, frustrating their develop-
ment as competence or as an instrument of action. They 
surely limit its extroversion, for this decision lies within 
objective and subjective frames of reference of the ideal of 
the common good, subject to multiple influences, origi-
nated from the biographical specificities of the thinker. 
The factors which trigger meta-reflective abstraction re-
main unknown: after all, what was the fuel of Hannah 
Arendt’s reflections, of the trajectory of her ideas, of the 
associations she made between facts and interpretations, 
of her points of view? Why would she have chosen to en-
lighten crowds with her reflective abstractions, opposing 
herself, with facts and arguments, to a binary judgment 
on the Jewish Holocaust? Maybe it would be pertinent 
here appealing to the not yet concluded concept of “un-
decidability”, elaborated by Derrida in collaboration with 
Gödel (Nascimento, 2014), to represent the more than 300 
pages written by her as demonstration illustrated by the 
formulation of the concept of “banality of evil”.
We conclude this essay depicting it metaphori-
cally with the figure of the ouroboros, fueling a transcen-
dent heuristics about what would be logical necessity, 
or logical-mathematical knowledge, what would be its 
ethics and how to put it in motion from the perspective 
of the common good, resuming the Aristotelic starting 
point in his Ethics to Nicomachean, in the theme under 
discussion.
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Sobre Hannah Arendt: ética e racionalidade na sociedade contemporânea
Resumo: Este ensaio visa refletir sobre como superar obstáculos que se antepõem à capacidade de pensar de forma racional, 
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Résumé: Cet essai vise à réfléchir sur comment surmonter des obstacles qui s’opposent à la capacité de penser de façon rationnelle: 
la capacité intellectuelle qui implique l’abstraction réflexive et son élaboration en une correspondante argumentation. On part 
de la constatation que, si l’on observe, d’une part, la croissance dans la complexité logique de la pensée colloquiale verbalisée, 
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